To understand Aristotle's argument in Physics ii " that "nature [is] among the causes that are for something" (198b10), it is first necessary to understand exactly what Aristotle means when he refers to "nature." When Aristotle uses the word, "nature," it "applies to any and all things that are by nature, without exception" (Lang 40). According to Aristotle, natural things are unique because "each of them has within itself a principle of motion and stability in place, in growth and decay, or in alteration" (Physics ii, 1, 192b14-15). Aristotle finds that "only certain things have such inner sources of motion" (Sachs 56), and these "forms" of nature "include animals and plants, their parts, and the four elements, earth, air, fire and water" (Lang 40). It is important to note, however, that things made up of the four elements, such as a statue that is made of earth and water, are not considered natural. Only the elements that it consists of are considered natural. In oth!
             er words, a statue is not natural because it is a statue; its elements are natural because they are elements and not because they make up a statue. It is also important to note that when Aristotle refers to the internal principle of motion or change, he implies that this internal principle belongs to a being, (ie. a tree or a human being,) in its own right and not coincidentally.
             Aristotle establishes a method, in Physics ii, 4-6, of determining whether something is either coincidental, or the opposite of coincidental. Physics portrays that the opposite of coincidental is teleological, and something that is teleological is an occurrence that takes place in order to achieve a purposeful end. The method by which one can determine whether something is either teleological or coincidental begins with the observation of a good result. This observation leads to two questions: was there a cause that yielded this good result? And, if so, does that particular c...