Sextus Empiricus' trilemma against justification is an argument presented
in response to Plato's claim that knowledge is justified true belief.
According to the trilemma, there can be no such thing as knowledge, because
we can have no real justification for our beliefs. This is the basis of
skepticism. There are many responses to that argument, including those of
the foundationalist, coherentist, and infinitist. This paper will outline
the general principles of Sextus Empiricus' Trilemma, as well as discuss
the responses to that trilemma according to the foundationalist, the
coherentist, and the infinitist. In addition, this paper will attempt to
show that the foundationalist response has the most validity.
Empiricus' trilemma begins with the assumption that we only have
knowledge if our beliefs are justified. If those beliefs are challenged,
there are only three ways in which we can attempt a justification. First,
we can attempt to justify our belief set by reference to some foundational
belief or belief set, otherwise known as foundationalism. The problem here
is that the second belief or belief set is also not justified by any
further belief. Second, we can justify our beliefs mutually, otherwise
known as coherentism. In other words, any set of beliefs is justified in
conjunction with another. Finally, we can create an endless digress of
justification, where each proposition is justified by a unique proposition,
which, in turn, is justified by another proposition, and so on. This is
Empiricus continues the above argument by discussing why each possible
justification is impossible. First, if we justify one belief by using
another belief, and the second belief is a "basic" belief that requires no
justification, we have not justified the first belief at all. For example,
if a person is trying to justify the belief that man is good, and uses the
belief that a...