On September 10, 2001, the day before terrorists struck the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., a report was issued to the U.S. Congress by Kenneth Katzman, "Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs" for the U.S. Department of State. "Signs continue to point to...a rise in the scope of threat posed by the independent network of exiled Saudi dissident Usama bin Ladin," Katzman wrote.
             The terrorist network of bin Laden, Katzman asserted, is "independently financed... [and] wants to strike within the United States itself." The world knows what happened the day after that report was issued. But what terrorist-related issues and policies have the Bush Administration dealt with subsequent to 9/11? How effective have those policies been, given the issues that those policies have raised? Those are the topics to be explored in this paper.
             What effect has terrorism had on U.S. policy since Sept. 11, 2001? According to Steven E. Miller, writing in Global Governance (2005), when the old Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the "old" ("Cold War") international order also crumbled into pieces. And following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush Administration's "new order" came into play. This new Bush international "order" (e.g., policy and strategy) writes Miller, "is structured around threats and responses to threats rather than around laws and institutions."
             What that means is the U.S. has staked out a policy of going it alone, or in some cases putting together "coalitions of the willing," with the stern proviso to countries that may or may not become allies against terrorism: "You are either with us or against us."
             International laws and institutions, under the Bush doctrine, Miller writes, may be "instruments or impediments," to be "utilized or spurned" as Bush sees fit. The Bush terrorism...