Aristotle distinguishes the concept of performing a just act from the concept of acting justly. Primarily, that distinction relates to the underlying motivation or purpose of performing the just acts. Just acts, such as those with beneficial consequences to others that are not specifically intended, may very well be consistent or in-line with justice, but without necessarily constituting acting justly. According to Aristotle's Nicomachean ethical principles, acting justly consists of performing just acts whose motivation is specifically to achieve just aims; a necessary element of acting justly is desiring that such acts achieve a just purpose.
             Donating money to charitable causes is an example of a just act, regardless of whether or not the donor particularly cares about the welfare of the recipients of his charity. If his main purpose for donating is to impress others or to improve his reputation or to save on taxes, the act is still just, but it is not considered to be acting justly. Rather, the charitable donation is a just act that merely coincides, or is in-line, with justice.
             Just Motivation, Just Acts, and Justice of Character
             Clearly, in terms of their evidence of his character, just acts are preferable to unjust acts. However, acting justly is evidence of higher character and virtue than merely performing just acts that happen to coincide with justice absent any specific interest in justice. Otherwise, devotion to achieving justice through one's acts could have no greater value or virtue than acts performed without any concern for justice. By definition, one who cares about acting justly is more just in character than one who remains wholly unconcerned about the ultimate effects of his choices and acts.
             Aristotle defines virtue of character in relation to excellence, but seemingly without distinction as to the inherent value of the object of excellence. Instead, Aristotle focuses on the subordination of diff...