We often come across the view that to judge a thing as good or beautiful is merely to give expression to one's own personal attitude towards things in general; or, in other words, that evaluations of moral and esthetic values are conditioned only subjectively, as opposed to perceptional judgments, in which the objective existence of things is conceived. Contrary to that view, it is possible to show a far-reaching analogy between perceptional judgments (Wahrnehmungsurteil), and axiological evaluations conceived as cognitive measures; and consequently between existence, which is affirmed in perceptional judgments , and goodness or beauty, which are affirmed in evaluations. This analogy gives foundation to a conclusion that the value of an object should, from an ontological point of view, be conceived in a way analogous to that of conceiving the object's existence.
             By a perceptional judgment we mean a judgment in which is affirmed the existence of an object perceived. A perceptional judgment has for its motive the perceptive representation (Wahrnehmungsvorstellung) of an object. Not every perceptive representation, however, is connected with a perceptional judgment: that one only is which happens to fall within the field of attention. Attention as a cognitive attitude is both a necessary condition for a perceptional judgment to arise, and a sufficient one in the sense that a perceptive representation which enters the field of attention acquires a motivating force that is sufficient for a perceptional judgment to appear. This is similar to the manner in which analytic judgments come into being; they (analytic judgments) are based immediately on concepts, just as perceptional judgments are based immediately on perceptive representations. E.g., the concept of a circle becomes the motive for an analytic judgment affirming certain properties in the circle, when that concept has entered the field of attention-attention being conceived as a co...