Those individuals upholding the philosophy that the course of history is repetitive may have never considered the advent of a nuclear world. With the possibilities of rouge states becoming, in terms of levels of destruction, as equally feared as even the most prosperous of nations, it is apparent that such a course has never crossed the path of our nation's forefathers. No longer is the weight of a nation's global influence contingent on the size, economic development, nor the romantic pride of its warriors (all requirements of a glorious empire), rather in the midst of a nuclear war such characteristics are deemed statistical causalities. In essence, the fate U.S. foreign policy can no longer be reliant on the past policies of the cold war, nor can it rely solely on the military advances in Iraqi – North Korea is different.
             While judging a book by its cover is not the best method of forming vital strategic foreign policies, it seems to be the only option when analyzing a nation hidden in exclusionism. Prior to the national division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, Korea was home to a society united by an unitary existence, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, and a historic bond of exclusionism towards outsiders – largely due to its history of invasion, influence, and fighting over its territory by the powerful neighbors. As a result of the North's hermit-like character, U.S. intelligence is limited and largely based on speculation; however, there are several disconcerting assumptions that must be incorporated into future U.S foreign policies.
             The first assumption (more so reality) is that North Korea may hold the ability to formulate weapons of mass destruction, i.e. nuclear weapons. According to a State Department press statement in October of 2002, North Korean officials admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons (Foreign Affairs 297). With this in mind, it is safe to ...